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Abstract
Catastrophe aversion and risk equity are important concepts both in risk management theory
and practice. Ralph Keeney (1980) was the first to formally define these concepts. He demon-
strated that the two concepts are always in conflict. Yet his result is based on the assumption
that individual risks are independent. It has therefore limited relevance for real-world catas-
trophic events. We extend Keeney’s result to dependent risks and derive the conditions under
which more equity and more correlation between two risks imply a more catastrophic situation.
We then generalize some of the results for multiple correlated risks.
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1 Introduction
The expected number of fatalities is perhaps the most common measure to assess and manage
social risks. However, the expectation operation does not account for important dimensions of
risk (Slovic et al., 1984). It neither reflects society’s preferences to avoid large scale accidents, nor
does it capture concerns over inequalities in the distribution of risk across individuals (Bovens and
Fleurbaey, 2012). Alternative criteria for managing public risks have therefore emerged. These
criteria aim at limiting the maximum probable loss or the maximum individual risk, reflecting
society’s anxiety to avoid a “bunching” of fatalities and its reluctance to accept risks that are
unequally distributed across people.
Ralph Keeney (1980) was the first to formally define the concepts of risk equity and catastrophe
aversion to capture both objectives. Risk equity is an ex ante concept corresponding to a preference
for equalizing the probability of dying across agents. Catastrophe aversion, on the other hand,
is an ex post concept corresponding to a preference for a mean-preserving concentration in the
distribution of fatalities. Assuming independent risks, Keeney (1980) showed that the two concepts
are always in conflict.1 Whenever one increases risk equity, the distribution of fatalities becomes
more catastrophic and vice versa. This result is challenging as it highlights the conflict between two
reasonable objectives of risk managers: limiting the risk burden to individuals and to society as a
whole. It has received some attention in the operations research and management literature (e.g.,
Fishburn, 1984; Keeney and Winkler, 1985; Sarin, 1985; Fishburn and Straffin, 1989; Fishburn and
Sarin, 1991, 1994, 1997; Gajdos et al., 2010), and more recently in the economics and social choice
literature (Bommier and Zuber, 2008; Fleurbaey, 2010; Bovens and Fleurbaey, 2012; Adler et al.,
2014; Rheinberger and Treich, 2016).
In this paper, we examine an aspect of the problem that has so far been largely overlooked—
the dependence structure of social risks. In today’s world, interdependent risks are the rule rather
than the exception. This observation is particularly true for potentially catastrophic risks such as
hurricanes, terrorist attacks, climate change or large-scale industrial accidents. In the remainder
of the paper we gradually develop this argument. In §2 we show that the more correlated the
risks faced by two agents are, the more catastrophic the corresponding distribution of fatalities is.
1Analogous results were already known in the mathematical statistics literature, see e.g. Hoeffding (1956) and
Karlin and Novikoff (1963).
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We then derive in §3 the necessary and sufficient condition under which an equity-increasing risk
transfer between two agents implies a more catastrophic distribution of risks. This condition pins
down the effects that moving toward more risk equity has on both the marginal distributions of the
two risks and on their correlation coefficient. We demonstrate that the condition holds whenever
the risk transfer has a positive effect on the correlation between the two risks.
Extending the analysis to more than two agents is challenging because pairwise correlations
provide an insufficient statistic to map out the dependence structure of multiple risks (Embrechts
et al., 2002). Nonetheless, we generalize some of the results obtained for the two-agent case in
§4 by imposing that, in a N -agent world, risk transfers between any two agents do not affect
the dependence structure of the remaining N − 2 agents, or by weakening the notion of more
catastrophic. In §5, we discuss some implications for policy makers. Longer proofs appear in the
Appendix.
2 Catastrophic and correlated risks
2.1 Definitions and notations
Consider a population of i = 1, ..., N agents, each of whom faces an individual probability of
dying pi ∈ [0, 1]. The risk of death is modeled as a Bernoulli random variable x˜i, which takes the
value 1 (i.e., agent i dies) with probability pi, and 0 otherwise. We are interested in the distribution
of fatalities:
d˜ :=
N∑
i=1
x˜i.
Following Adler et al. (2014), we define a more catastrophic distribution of fatalities based on the
concept of second-order stochastic dominance (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970).
Definition 1. Assume E[d˜] = E[d˜′]. We say a distribution of fatalities d˜ is more catastrophic than
another distribution d˜′ iff for any concave function f , E[f(d˜)] 6 E[f(d˜′)].
Assuming that d˜ is more catastrophic than d˜′ thus implies that d˜ is a mean-preserving spread
of d˜′. Catastrophe avoidance as defined by Keeney (1980, Theorem 2, p. 532) is a particular
case of Definition 1, in which d˜ and d˜′ apply to binary risks with one safe outcome (i.e., an
outcome which implies no fatality at all). Keeney’s analysis assumes that the social planner applies
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the axioms of expected utility to evaluate the number of fatalities occurring in scenarios with
different probabilities. Accordingly, catastrophe aversion can be formally defined as a concave
(social) vNM utility function f .2 Now, let f(d) = −d2. It follows immediately that a more
catastrophic distribution must have a greater variance, but not the other way around. This leads
to our second definition.
Definition 2. We say a distribution of fatalities d˜ is more variable than another distribution d˜′ iff
var(d˜) > var(d˜′).
Based on these two definitions, we will analyze the relationship between catastrophe aversion
and risk equity. To begin with, we focus on two agents whose risks of death, x˜1 and x˜2, may
be correlated. We introduce the probability space Ω, comprised of a finite (but potentially large)
number of states S, to describe the dependence structure of the two risks. For now, let us assume
that Ω has S := 8 equiprobable states (ω1, ..., ω8) and consider two agents, 1 and 2, who face the
probability of dying p1 and p2, respectively.
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Throughout the paper, we will make use of the following matrix notation to illustrate risky
social situations.
x˜1 x˜2
ω1
ω2
ω3
ω4
ω5
ω6
ω7
ω8

1 1
1 0
1 0
1 0
0 1
0 0
0 0
0 0

d˜A
2
1
0
pi2 =
1
8
pi1 =
4
8
pi0 =
3
8
(A)
Each of the S := 8 rows in this matrix corresponds to one possible state of the world. For
2It is, however, not obvious that society should display catastrophe aversion. See Rheinberger and Treich (2016)
for an extensive discussion.
3We use equiprobable states to ease the exposition of our examples. We emphasize, however, that the results also
hold for unequal state probabilities as each state can be broken down into several equiprobable states.
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s = 1, ..., 8, the ith value in row s can be interpreted as x˜i(ωs), which is the value taken by the
random variable x˜i in state ωs. In situation (A), there is only one state (ω1) in which the two agents
die simultaneously. Each state in situation (A) has the same probability 1/S = 18 to occur. x˜1(ω)
can take two values: 1 with probability p1 := Pr(x˜1 = 1) =
1
2 (corresponding to the occurrence
of a state in which the first agent dies) and 0 with probability 1 − p1 = 12 (corresponding to a
state in which the first agent survives). Likewise, the probability that the second agent dies is
p2 := Pr(x˜2 = 1) =
1
4 . Note that x˜2 does not depend on the realizations of x˜1 and vice versa:
Pr(x˜2 = 1|x˜1 = 1) = Pr(x˜2 = 1) and Pr(x˜1 = 1|x˜2 = 1) = Pr(x˜1 = 1). In other words, the two
risks are independent.
Based on the matrix notation, the computation of the distribution of fatalities d˜A := x˜1 + x˜2
is straightforward. We only need to sum the values in each row to find that the probabilities of
observing zero, one, and two fatalities are equal to pi0 := Pr(d˜ = 0) =
3
8 , pi1 := Pr(d˜ = 1) =
4
8 , and
pi2 := Pr(d˜ = 2) =
1
8 , respectively. The corresponding distribution of fatalities is represented by
the probability tree next to the matrix.
2.2 Correlation and the distribution of fatalities
In a two-agent world, there is a fundamental relationship between the distribution of fatalities
and the correlation of the risks (Meyer and Strulovici, 2012). Proposition 1 captures the relation-
ship assuming fixed marginal distributions (i.e., the parameters p1 and p2 are kept fixed). Thus, at
this stage, there is no change in risk equity involved.
Proposition 1. Under N = 2, the four following statements are equivalent:
(i) the probability of simultaneous fatalities increases;
(ii) the correlation between the individual risks increases;
(iii) the distribution of fatalities is more catastrophic (Definition 1);
(iv) the distribution of fatalities is more variable (Definition 2).
Proof. We first prove that the distribution becomes more catastrophic iff the probability of si-
multaneous fatalities, pi2 := Pr(x˜1 = 1, x˜2 = 1), increases. For N = 2 agents, E[f(d˜)] =
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pi0f(0)+pi1f(1)+pi2f(2), where pii := Pr(d˜ = i) for i = 0, 1, 2. We know that E[d˜] = p1 +p2, so that
pi1 + 2pi2 = p1 + p2 (for f(x) = x) and pi0 + pi1 + pi2 = 1. Using these two equalities, we can express
pi0 and pi1 as functions of pi2: E[f(d˜)] = (1− (p1 +p2−2pi2)−pi2)f(0)+(p1 +p2−2pi2)f(1)+pi2f(2).
This expression can be further simplified to
E[f(d˜)] = (1− p1 − p2)f(0) + (p1 + p2)f(1) + pi2(f(0)− 2f(1) + f(2)).
By Jensen’s inequality we have f(0) − 2f(1) + f(2) 6 0 for all f concave. Therefore, E[f(d˜)]
decreases iff pi2 increases. Thus (iii)⇔(i).
Next, we turn to the joint probability of two random Bernoulli variables. We have
pi2 = Pr(x˜1 = 1, x˜2 = 1) = E[x˜1x˜2] = p1p2 + ρ
√
p1(1− p1)
√
p2(1− p2)
by the definition of the correlation coefficient ρ between the two risks x˜1 and x˜2. Thus pi2 increases
whenever ρ increases: (i)⇔(ii). To conclude the proof, observe that
var(x˜1 + x˜2) = p1(1− p1) + p2(1− p2) + 2ρ
√
p1(1− p1)
√
p2(1− p2),
which increases iff correlation ρ increases. Thus (ii)⇔(iv). 
Let us provide an intuition for this result by modifying the introductory example (A). The
distribution of fatalities can be more or less catastrophic depending only on the interaction between
the two individual risks of death. In situation (B) below, we alter the dependence structure between
x˜1 and x˜2 so that the occurrence of two simultaneous fatalities becomes most likely. By contrast,
situation (C) illustrates a dependence structure in which two simultaneous fatalities are impossible:
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x˜1 x˜2
1 1
1 1
1 0
1 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0

x˜1 x˜2
1 0
1 0
1 0
1 0
0 0
0 0
0 1
0 1

(B) (C)
d˜B
2
1
0
pi2 =
2
8
pi1 =
2
8
pi0 =
4
8
d˜C
2
1
0
pi2 = 0
pi1 =
6
8
pi0 =
2
8
Risky situation (B) implies the most catastrophic distribution of fatalities. This situation, in
which the worst outcome (i.e. the joint death of two agents) becomes as likely as it can be given
the marginals, is known as the comonotonic dependence structure. By contrast, risky situation
(C) gives rise to the least catastrophic distribution of fatalities. This situation is also known as
the antimonotonic dependence structure because outcomes are ordered in reverse order, thereby
minimizing the probability to observe simultaneous fatalities. Indeed, d˜B is more catastrophic (and
also more variable) than d˜C .
The result in Proposition 1 is linked to Epstein and Tanny’s (1980) concept of “generalized cor-
relation”. This concept characterizes the condition under which two random variables x˜1 and x˜2 are
more correlated than two other random variables x˜′1 and x˜′2 (see also Tchen, 1980 and Wright, 1987).
Epstein and Tanny show that this condition is formally equivalent to E[u(x˜1, x˜2)] 6 E[u(x˜′1, x˜′2)]
whenever the cross partial derivatives are nonpositive, i.e. u12 6 0. Now, take u(x1, x2) = f(x1+x2)
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so that u12 6 0 is equivalent to f ′′ 6 0. This proves that an increasing “generalized correlation”
between x˜1 and x˜2 is necessary and sufficient for obtaining a more catastrophic distribution x˜1 + x˜2,
with x˜1 and x˜2 being Bernoulli random variables.
From Proposition 1 we know that the distribution of fatalities becomes most (least) catas-
trophic when the correlation between the two risks is maximized (minimized). In the case of two
agents, it is always possible to fully identify the least and most catastrophic distribution of fatal-
ities. This result is summarized in the following lemma, and will turn out to be useful later. In
particular, we notice that the range of correlation between two risks depends on their marginal
probabilities.
Lemma 1. The correlation ρ between two Bernoulli random variables x˜1 and x˜2 with p1 > p2 is
bounded by:
• ρ ∈
[
−
√
p1p2√
1−p1
√
1−p2 ,
√
p2
√
1−p1√
p1
√
1−p2
]
, if p1 + p2 6 1
• ρ ∈
[
−
√
1−p1
√
1−p2√
p1p2
,
√
p2
√
1−p1√
p1
√
1−p2
]
, if p1 + p2 > 1
• ρ = 0, if p1 = 1 (agent 1 is certain to die) or p2 = 0 (agent 2 is certain to survive)
Proof. The original proof of Lemma 1 is due to Meilijson and Nadas (1979) and Tchen (1980).
Here, we only provide a sketch of the proof. We start with minimum correlation, which is attained
when the Bernoulli variables are antimonotonic, i.e. when the number of simultaneous deaths is
minimized. Specifically, we know that pi2 = E[x˜1x˜2] = Pr(x˜1 = 1, x˜2 = 1) = max(0, p1 + p2 − 1).
There are two cases p1 + p2 6 1 and p1 + p2 > 1. In both cases, the minimum correlation is equal
to
max(0, p1 + p2 − 1)− p1p2√
p1 (1− p1) p2 (1− p2)
.
By considering these two cases separately and after some simplifications, one obtains the expressions
of minimum correlation presented in the proposition.
The maximum correlation is obtained when the Bernoulli variables are comonotonic, i.e. when
the number of simultaneous fatalities is maximized. In the two-agent world comonotonicity means
that, in each state in which agent 2 dies, agent 1 dies as well. Because the maximum probability of
simultaneous fatalities is equal to Pr(x˜1 = 1, x˜2 = 1) = min(p1, p2) = p2, their maximum correlation
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equals
p2 − p1p2√
p1 (1− p1) p2 (1− p2)
=
√
p2
√
1− p1√
p1
√
1− p2 . 
One practical remark on Lemma 1 seems in order. The natural bounds of the correlation
interval are only attained in the special case where p1 = p2 =
1
2 . This implies that for most binary
risks the interval of attainable correlation is strictly narrower than ρ ∈ [−1, 1].
3 Risk equity and its implications
Following Keeney (1980) and the subsequent literature cited in the introduction, we define
risk equity based on a Pigou-Dalton transfer in risk: a non-leaky transfer of probability mass from
a more exposed to a less exposed individual, so that the transfer does not reverse the ranking of
the two individuals in terms of their probability to die.4
Definition 3. We say a distribution of fatalities d˜ is more equitable than another distribution d˜′
iff a Pigou-Dalton transfer in risk δ from a more exposed agent 1 to a less exposed agent 2 would
reduce the risk faced by agent 1 and raise the risk faced by agent 2 without switching their ranking
in terms of absolute risk and without changing other individuals’ risks. Formally, the probabilities
of dying before the transfer are p1 and p2, with p1 > p2; after the transfer, the probabilities of dying
are p′1 = p1 − δ and p′2 = p2 + δ, where 0 6 δ 6 p1−p22 .
Accordingly, a Pigou-Dalton transfer in risk always decreases the “gap” in risk between the
agents 1 and 2 (Keeney, 1980; Adler et al., 2014). This definition is intuitive, but also general
since any mean-preserving contraction in the distribution of individual risks within society can
be obtained through a series of Pigou-Dalton transfers. Our first objective is to extend Keeney’s
result to our more general definition of catastrophic risk. Proposition 2 asserts that, under the
assumption of independent risks before and after the transfer, more risk equity always implies a
more catastrophic distribution of fatalities.
4Cox (2012) argues that—unlike income—mortality risk is not fungible and cannot be easily transferred from one
individual to another. Regardless of whether one agrees with Cox or not, our definition does not require a direct
physical transfer of risk from one individual to another. It merely implies the existence of different policy options
under which two individuals face different risks.
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Proposition 2. Assume that the risks faced by N agents are independent. In that case, any Pigou-
Dalton transfer in risk between two agents leads to a more catastrophic distribution of fatalities, if
the risks to the N agents remain independent after the transfer.
Proof. Given independence, we can focus on the risks affected by the transfer. Consider a change in
the risks faced by agents 1 and 2, and denote y˜ := x˜3 + ...+ x˜N . We define E[f(d˜)] = E[f1(x˜1 + x˜2)],
with f1(x) = E[f(x + y˜)]. Since under the assumption of independent risks f1 is concave iff f is
concave, the presence of N − 2 independent agents does not affect the comparative statics anal-
ysis. From Proposition 1 and the equivalence between a more catastrophic and a more variable
distribution of fatalities, we know that it suffices to show that a Pigou-Dalton transfer in risk
between agents 1 and 2 increases the variance. This is always true because var[d˜′] − var[d˜] =
[(p1 − δ)(1 − p1 + δ) + (p2 + δ)(1 − p2 − δ)] − [p1(1 − p1) + p2(1 − p2)], which is positive for any
δ 6 p1−p22 (and which is exactly the condition needed for the Pigou-Dalton transfer). 
3.1 Two agents facing dependent risks
Our next objective is to extend the result of Proposition 2 to the case of dependent risks. To
illustrate the complexity that arises from the interaction between only two risks (N = 2), we start
from example (A) presented in §2.1 and analyze three possible risk transfers and their respective
effect on the distribution of fatalities. Remember that in situation (A) the risks of two agents are
independent. Here, and in contrast to Keeney (Proposition 2), we do not assume that the risks
remain independent after the Pigou-Dalton transfer. Consider the following situations labeled (D),
(E), and (F ), respectively. (Risks after a transfer of δ = 18 are denoted by x˜
′
1 and x˜
′
2.) In all three
situations, the agents face the same probability to die (p′1 := p1 − δ = p′2 := p2 + δ = 38). However,
in none of the situations the two risks are independent after the transfer (as the correlation ρ′ is
not equal to zero) and, consequently, Proposition 2 no longer applies.
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x˜′1 x˜′2
1 0
1 0
1 1
0 1
0 1
0 0
0 0
0 0

x˜′1 x˜′2
1 0
1 0
1 0
0 1
0 1
0 1
0 0
0 0

x˜′1 x˜′2
1 1
1 1
1 1
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0

(D) (E) (F )
d˜′D
2
1
0
pi2 =
1
8
pi1 =
4
8
pi0 =
3
8
d˜′E
1
0
pi2 =
6
8
pi0 =
2
8
d˜′F
2
0
pi2 =
3
8
pi0 =
5
8
The new correlation ρ′ between the agents’ risks can be computed as follows:
ρ′ := corr(x˜′1, x˜
′
2) =
E[x˜′1x˜′2]− (p1 − δ)(p2 + δ)√
(p1 − δ)(1− p1 + δ)
√
(p2 + δ)(1− p2 − δ)
.
For the above situations, we have: ρ′D = −0.066, ρ′E = −0.6, and ρ′F = 1, respectively. The
distribution of fatalities d˜′ := x˜′1 + x˜′2 after each of the feasible Pigou-Dalton transfers is fully
characterized by the corresponding probability trees. Compared to situation (A), the distribution
of fatalities becomes strictly more catastrophic in situation (F ), strictly less catastrophic in situation
(E), and is identical in situation (D).
Situations (A) to (F ) make it clear that the change in the distribution of fatalities is governed
by two sources: (i) the effect of the Pigou-Dalton transfer in risk on the marginal distributions,
and (ii) the change in correlation induced by the transfer. Both changes have an impact on how
catastrophic the distribution of fatalities is. Situations (B) and (C) have illustrated that an increase
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(or decrease) in catastrophic risk might be caused by a change in correlation only. Situations (D) to
(F ) illustrate that an increase (or decrease) in catastrophic risk might also be due to a simultaneous
change in correlation and risk equity.
The comparison of (A) with (D) is particularly revealing as (D) is obtained from (A) by
switching a “1” and a “0” in a single row, and by relabeling the states. The distributions of fatalities
are fully determined by the number of “1’s” in each row. Therefore, the two distributions must
be identical before and after the transfer so that d˜A and d˜
′
D have the same distribution. In other
words, the induced change in the marginal distributions of individual risks x˜i is “counteracted”
by its negative impact on the correlation, which keeps the sum of x˜i’s identically distributed.
This insight underlines that it is all but simple to extend Proposition 2, and there is no hope
to generically sign the comparative statics analysis for any possible risk transfer without making
specific restrictions on the correlation.5
3.2 The necessary and sufficient condition
In this section we pin down the necessary and sufficient condition under which a Pigou-
Dalton transfer in risk between two agents results in a more catastrophic distribution of fatalities.
The condition comprises the special case in which the risks have identical correlation before and
after the transfer. Yet we also provide a more general analysis, in which we allow changes in the
correlation before and after the transfer. This degree of generality is important for many real world
applications.6
Next, we demonstrate that a Pigou-Dalton transfer in risk makes the distribution of fatalities
more catastrophic whenever the correlation after the transfer is larger than a specified threshold.
Proposition 3. Assume N = 2 and p1 > p2. Let ρ denote the correlation between the initial
risks x˜1 and x˜2. After a Pigou-Dalton transfer in risk δ ∈
[
0, p1−p22
]
, the distribution of fatalities
5For S := 8 states (ω1, ..., ω8), it is impossible to find a situation in which the correlation between x˜
′
1 and x˜
′
2 is
equal to 0 (i.e., in which the risks are still independent after the risk transfer) and for which the result of Keeney
(Proposition 2) would hence hold. It is, however, possible to construct such a situation by invoking more states of
the world. We provide one such example in the Appendix .
6Consider the introduction of a new technology—say a better navigation system in cars. This technology will
reduce differences in the individual risk of having a car accident (e.g., by balancing out heterogeneity in driving skills
or in car safety features). Therefore, the technology will increase risk equity. On the other hand, it may also raise the
dependence of individual accident risks, e.g. if there is a software bug that lets the system crash in all the cars at a
particular date. Hence, the new technology will increase both risk equity and dependence at the same time. Similar
observations have been made, for instance, on systemic risk in the banking industry (see Beale et al., 2011).
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becomes more catastrophic iff the correlation ρ′ between x˜′1 and x˜′2 is larger than the critical level
of correlation ρ∗, i.e.
ρ′ > ρ∗ := δ(p2 − p1 + δ) + ρ
√
p1
√
1− p1√p2
√
1− p2√
1− p1 + δ
√
p1 − δ
√
p2 + δ
√
1− p2 − δ
. (1)
Proof. We first extend a result in Proposition 1 showing that even when the marginals p1 and p2
are not kept fixed before and after the risk transfer, an increase in the probability of simultaneous
deaths is equivalent to a more catastrophic distribution of fatalities. Let pi′2 = pi2 + γ > 0. Keeping
the number of expected fatalities constant, i.e. pi′1 + 2pi′2 = pi1 + 2pi2, we have pi′1 = pi1− 2γ > 0 and
in turn pi′0 = pi0 + γ, because the sum of probabilities must equal one. Therefore, the distribution
is more catastrophic iff γ > 0, and thus pi′2 > pi2.
Next, we compute the respective probabilities of simultaneous deaths before and after the risk
transfer. We find that
pi2 = E[x˜1x˜2] = p1p2 + ρ
√
p1(1− p1)
√
p2(1− p2), (2)
and
pi′2 = E[x˜
′
1x˜
′
2]
= (p1 − δ)(p2 + δ) + ρ′
√
(p1 − δ)(1− p1 + δ)
√
(p2 + δ)(1− p2 − δ). (3)
pi′2 > pi2 whenever ρ′ is sufficiently high (i.e., iff condition (1) is satisfied). 
Note that when ρ = 0, then ρ∗ < 0. This result is intuitive as a Pigou-Dalton transfer when
risks are independent increases the joint probability of deaths (see also Proposition 4, (i)). As
stated above, a Pigou-Dalton transfer in risk may have two distinct effects on the distribution
of fatalities: i) through the change in the marginal distributions and ii) through a change in the
correlation between the two risks. Condition (1) in Proposition 3 depends on both effects, and it
seems useful to think about them separately. The effect on the marginal distributions corresponds
to a change in δ, keeping the correlation structure fixed: ρ′ = ρ. The effect on the dependence
structure corresponds to a change in correlation from ρ to ρ′ assuming no changes in the marginal
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distributions (i.e., δ = 0). However, it would be fallacious to separate the two effects as the change
in correlation is bounded (see Lemma 1), and the range over which it is defined depends on the
marginal distributions.7 In other words, the range of attainable correlation between x˜′1 and x˜′2 is a
function of δ, because the correlation ρ′ between two risks with respective probabilities p1 − δ and
p2 + δ cannot be larger than
ρmax(δ) :=
√
p2 + δ√
p1 − δ
√
1− p1 + δ√
1− p2 − δ
. (4)
The minimum correlation depends on whether (p1 − δ) + (p2 + δ) = p1 + p2 is larger than 1 or not
and is also defined by Lemma 1. Furthermore, ρmax(0) equals the maximum correlation ρ between
the initial risks if δ = 0.
Figure 1 displays the comparative statics analysis for a numerical example where the two effects
are simultaneously at work. The grey-shaded areas in the four panels of Figure 1 represent the
admissible range for the transfer δ (on the x-axis) and the correlation ρ′ (on the y-axis) parameters
such that the distribution of fatalities is more catastrophic after the Pigou-Dalton transfer (the
example assumes that p1 = 0.8, p2 = 0.3, δ ∈
[
0, p1−p22
]
, and considers different initial values of ρ).
More specifically, Figure 1 illustrates four situations in which the initial correlation between the
two agents’ risks is equal to ρ = ρmin(0) = −0.76 (Panel A), ρ = −0.5 (Panel B), ρ = 0 (Panel C),
and ρ = ρmax(0) = 0.33 (Panel D), respectively. Each panel plots the critical level of correlation
ρ∗ as well as the attainable minimum and maximum correlation (4) as a function of δ using the
relationships of Lemma 1. Two areas are displayed, the grey hatched (light green) area corresponds
to the case in which catastrophic risk increases (decreases) after the Pigou-Dalton transfer of δ.
Several special cases of Proposition 3 are worth to be discussed in more detail. We summarize
them in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. Assume N = 2 and p1 > p2. In the following special cases, the distribution of
fatalities becomes more catastrophic after a Pigou-Dalton transfer in risk:
(i) ρ′ > ρ and δ > 0 (which includes Keeney’s (1980) result for ρ′ = ρ = 0, and fixed correlation
ρ′ = ρ, as special cases);
7This implies that the comparative statics analysis of a change in the risk transfer δ, assuming that the correlation
ρ is kept constant, can be fallacious.
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Panel A: ρ = −0.76 Panel B: ρ = −0.5
Panel C: ρ = 0 Panel D: ρ = 0.33
Figure 1: Correlation domains of ρ′ for four initial values of ρ, assuming p1 = 0.8, p2 = 0.3, and
δ ∈ [0, p1−p22 ] .
(ii) δ = 0 and ρ′ > ρ (no change in the marginal distribution of fatalities, but an increase in
correlation);
(iii) ρ is equal to the minimum correlation (as computed in Lemma 1) between the two risks before
the Pigou-Dalton transfer with δ > 0;
(iv) ρ′ is equal to the maximum correlation (as computed in Lemma 1) between the two risks after
the Pigou-Dalton transfer with δ > 0;
(v) δ > 0 and p1 = 1 (agent 1 is certain to die) or p2 = 0 (agent 2 is certain to survive).
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Proof. We start from the expressions of pi2 and pi
′
2 given by Eqs. (2)-(3) and show that pi
′
2 > pi2 in
each of the above statements (i)-(v).
In order to prove (i), note that by definition a Pigou-Dalton transfer imposes δ 6 p1−p22 , so that
p1p2 6 (p1−δ)(p2+δ) and
√
1− p1 + δ
√
p1 − δ
√
p2 + δ
√
1− p2 − δ > √p1
√
1− p1√p2
√
1− p2. For
ρ′ > ρ > 0, the proof of (i) follows directly from the expressions of pi2 and pi′2 in Eqs. (2)-(3) and
pi′2 > pi2. For ρ 6 ρ′ < 0, the result still holds but the proof is longer and therefore relegated to the
Appendix.
The proof of (ii) follows directly from Proposition 1. This case isolates the effect of correlation.
Note that (iii) and (iv) are special cases of (i).
Finally, we prove (v) as follows. First, observe that for p1 = 1 we have ρ
∗ := δ(p2−1+δ)√
δ(1−δ)
√
(p2+δ)(1−p2−δ)
,
which equals the minimum bound identified by Lemma 1 (for p1 + p2 > 1). Second, observe that
for p2 = 0, ρ
∗ = δ(−p1+δ)√
(1−p1+δ)(p1−δ)
√
δ(1−δ) , which equals the minimum bound identified by Lemma 1
(for p1 + p2 6 1). Thus, we always obtain ρ′ > ρ∗ for these two special cases. 
Statement (i) of Proposition 4 is apparent in all of the four panels in Figure 1: the horizontal
line representing the level ρ′ = ρ always belongs to the grey-shaded area where the distribution
of fatalities becomes more catastrophic. Statement (ii) follows immediately from the inspection of
the ρ-values at δ = 0. Statement (iii) corresponds to Panel A in Figure 1, for which the correlation
between the initial risks is minimum. Statement (iv) is, again, apparent in all four panels as the
dashed line that represents the maximum correlation for ρ′ always belongs to the grey-shaded area,
in which the distribution of fatalities is more catastrophic. Statement (v) illustrates a Pigou-Dalton
transfer between two agents in which the correlation between the initial risks is equal to 0, which
is also the minimum attainable correlation.
4 Generalization to more than two agents
We already observed in the two-agent world that the distribution of fatalities can become more
or less catastrophic when either the correlation or the marginal distributions are altered through a
Pigou-Dalton transfer in risk. In this section, we parallel the previous discussion for N > 2 agents.
As in §2.2, we first discuss whether the distribution of fatalities becomes more (or less) catastrophic
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when only the dependence structure changes. Based on §3, we then look at the effect of a change in
the marginal distributions of two risks in the presence of N−2 other agents. Under the assumption
of a fixed dependence structure among the N − 2 other agents, we show that the results obtained
for N = 2 still hold. Next, we relax the constraint on the dependence structure and, instead,
make assumptions about pairwise correlations. As is well known, pairwise correlations alone do
not provide sufficient information to pin down the dependence structure of the x˜1, ..., x˜N risks. We
can, however, show that the distribution of fatalities becomes more variable after a Pigou-Dalton
transfer with uncorrelated risks. At the end of §4, we derive more general sufficiency conditions
under which the distribution of fatalities becomes more variable after a Pigou-Dalton transfer in
risk.
4.1 Extremal dependence and the distribution of fatalities
In situations with N > 2 agents it is not obvious how one should compare distributions of
fatalities against each other as it is unclear how the dependence structure among N risks should
be defined. Even for Bernoulli random variables, the dependence structure involves more than the
pairwise correlation coefficients ρij (as in §2.2).8 Without restricting the dependence structure of
the N -agents’ risks, we can derive results for the comonotonic and antimonotonic case, respectively.
These two extreme dependence structures are defined as follows.
Definition 4. Consider i = 1, 2, ..., N agents with pi ∈ (0, 1) and let d˜ = x˜1 + ...+ x˜N be the corre-
sponding distribution of fatalities. Let then d˜c denote the comonotonic dependence structure (also
known as the maximum correlation between the risks). Moreover, let d˜a denote the antimonotonic
dependence structure implying that in all states either M or M + 1 deaths occur. Formally, M is
the integer number such that the expected number of fatalities is µ := p1 +p2 + ...+pN ∈ [M,M+1[.
The distribution of fatalities d˜a thus takes one of two values: M with probability pM = M + 1− µ,
or M + 1 with probability 1− pM = µ−M .9
Based on this definition, we obtain the following intuitive result.
Proposition 5. The distribution of fatalities d˜ is always less catastrophic than d˜c, and always more
8Situations (J) and (K) in §4.3 provide an example of uncorrelated risks that are still not independent.
9Note that the expression of pM is computed such that the expected number of fatalities is preserved; i.e.,
pMM + (1− pM )(M + 1) = µ.
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catastrophic than d˜a. Namely, for all f concave and all possible distributions of fatalities d˜:
E[f(d˜c)] 6 E[f(d˜)] 6 E[f(d˜a)] = f(M)pM + f(M + 1)(1− pM ).
Proposition 5 is closely related to Lemma 1 as it defines an admissible range of dependence
for N > 2 agents (see the Appendix for a detailed proof). The most and least catastrophic
distributions of fatalities, d˜c and d˜a, are obtained when correlation is “maximized” and “minimized”,
respectively. Meilijson and Nadas (1979) proved that maximum correlation is obtained whenever
risks are comonotonic; i.e., concentrated to specific states of the world. The least catastrophic
distribution of fatalities is obtained by a generalization of the negative dependence structure in N
dimensions. This generalization is far from trivial, however. Take the example of three risks—x˜, y˜,
and z˜—and assume that x˜ is negatively correlated with y˜ and also negatively correlated with z˜; then,
by definition, y˜ and z˜ must be positively correlated. This simple example highlights that it is not
straightforward to define what it means that three variables are negatively correlated (Meyer and
Strulovici, 2012). In the special case of Proposition 5, all risks are Bernoulli distributed and the least
catastrophic distribution of fatalities is therefore explicitly known (see Bernard et al. (2017) and
the proof in the Appendix.For more general distributions of risks, Puccetti and Ru¨schendorf (2012)
recently proposed a rearrangement algorithm, which approximates the antimonotonic dependence
structure of high-dimensional problems.10
Let us further illustrate Proposition 5. Situations (G) to (I) have the same marginal distri-
butions for x˜1, x˜2, and x˜3 (p1 = 1/2, p2 = 1/4, and p3 = 1/2), but they differ in terms of their
10The rearrangement algorithm is based on the following idea. Denote the distribution of fatalities aggregated over
all but one agent, say agent i, by d˜−i :=
∑
j 6=i x˜j . The distribution of fatalities becomes less variable iff the correlation
ρi between d˜−i and x˜i decreases (for any agent i = 1, 2, ..., N). This result follows from the fact that the variability of
the distribution of fatalities can be expressed as var(d˜) = var(x˜i + d˜−i)= var(x˜i) + var(d˜−i) + 2ρi
√
var(d˜−i)
√
var(x˜i),
in which only ρi is affected.
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dependence structure.
x˜1 x˜2 x˜3
1 0 1
1 1 0
1 0 1
1 0 0
0 0 0
0 1 1
0 0 0
0 0 1

x˜1 x˜2 x˜3
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 0 1
1 0 1
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0

x˜1 x˜2 x˜3
1 0 1
1 0 0
1 0 0
1 0 0
0 0 1
0 1 1
0 1 0
0 0 1

(G) (H) (I)
d˜G
2
1
0
pi2 =
4
8
pi1 =
2
8
pi0 =
2
8
d˜cH
3
2
0
pi3 =
2
8
pi2 =
2
8
pi0 =
4
8
d˜aI
2
1
pi2 =
2
8
pi1 =
6
8
Situation (G) is a situation with uncorrelated risks. Specifically, all pairs {x˜1, x˜2}, {x˜1, x˜3},
and {x˜2, x˜3} have pairwise zero correlation (ρ12 = ρ13 = ρ23 = 0). Situation (H) gives rise
to the most catastrophic distribution of fatalities d˜cH , and situation (I) to the least catastrophic
distribution of fatalities d˜aI . The expected number of fatalities is in all three situations µ = E[d˜] =
1.25, but the range of possible outcomes differs across the situations. In particular, d˜aI takes on only
two values: one death with probability pM = 1 + 1− 1.25 = 0.75 and two deaths with probability
1− pM = 0.25. Also observe that the least catastrophic distribution of fatalities is such that each
individual risk x˜i is in reverse order with d˜−i :=
∑
j 6=i x˜j (i.e., with the distribution of fatalities
over all but agent i). In other words, the states wherein x˜i = 1 correspond to the states of the
smallest value of d˜−i are attained. (As outlined in footnote 10, this is necessary to attain minimum
correlation.) Lastly, note that the variability of the distributions of fatalities largely differs across
the situations: var(d˜G) = 11/16 in (G), var(d˜
c
H) = 27/16 in (H), and var(d˜
a
I ) = 3/16 in (I). By
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definition, the latter two variance terms are the maximum and minimum variance, respectively.
The result in Proposition 5 indicates that the equivalence result between an increase in de-
pendence and a more catastrophic distribution holds under N > 2 for the two most extreme
distributions of fatalities. However, the result is not general because it does not characterize the
effect of “more dependence”. Moreover, we can easily show that another equivalence result of
Proposition 1 fails. An increasing probability of simultaneous fatalities no longer implies a more
catastrophic distribution. A simple counterexample with N = 3 suffices to demonstrate this.
Define d˜ by (pi0, pi1, pi2, pi3) = (0, 3/5, 0, 2/5) and d˜
′ by (pi0, pi1, pi2, pi3) = (1/5, 0, 3/5, 1/5). Both
distributions have the same mean (i.e., 9/5), but d˜ implies a higher probability of simultaneous
fatalities pi3 (i.e., 2/5 > 1/5). Nevertheless, d˜ has a lower probability that at least two fatalities
occur (i.e., 2/5 < 4/5). There exist (at least) two concave functions that do not imply the same
order: E[−max(d˜ − 1, 0)] = −0.8 > E[−max(d˜′ − 1, 0)] = −1 and E[−max(d˜ − 2, 0)] = −0.4 <
E[−max(d˜′ − 2, 0)] = −0.2. Therefore, d˜ cannot be more catastrophic than d˜′.
4.2 Pigou-Dalton transfers with fixed dependence
We now examine the impact of a Pigou-Dalton transfer in risk between two agents in a risky
social situation involving N > 2 agents. Remember that Keeney (1980)’s result considers N agents
but assumes risk independence among the N agents. In practice, independent risks are often
implausible and we therefore extend Keeney’s result assuming fixed risk dependence among the
N − 2 other agents, who are not involved in the Pigou-Dalton transfer.
Proposition 6. Let N > 2, and consider a Pigou Dalton transfer in risk between agents 1 and
2. Assume that this transfer does not affect the dependence between the other agents in the fol-
lowing sense: only the probabilities that either agent 1 or 2 dies and that both agents 1 and 2 die
simultaneously may be altered by the risk transfer. Then, the result given in Proposition 3 still
holds: the distribution of fatalities becomes more catastrophic iff ρ′ > ρ∗ where ρ′ is the correlation
between agents 1 and 2’s risks after the risk transfer and ρ∗ is the critical level of correlation given
in Equation (1).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 6 demonstrates that, if the transfer in risk does not affect the dependence structure
among the N − 2 other agents, Keeney’s result carries over to N > 2 agents provided it holds for
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agents 1 and 2 (in the N = 2 case). The latter condition is met, for instance, if the correlation
between the two agents stays the same, i.e. ρ = ρ′, as shown in Proposition 4.
Another special case assumes fixed dependence among all N agents, which implies fixed pair-
wise correlations and, therefore, ρ = ρ′. As an immediate corollary of Proposition 6, Keeney’s result
holds whenever the dependence among all N agents is kept fixed. One may argue that keeping the
dependence structure among the agents not involved in the Pigou-Dalton transfer fixed is a strong
assumption. Yet, as we show in §4.4, if one relaxes this constraint, one might not even be able to
conclude whether or not the resulting distribution of fatalities is more variable.
4.3 Pigou-Dalton transfers with pairwise uncorrelated risks
In the remainder of the paper, we will relax the constraint on the dependence structure, and
make instead assumptions about pairwise correlations. Even though it is well known that pairwise
correlations provide an insufficient statistic to map out the full dependence structure of multiple
risks (Embrechts et al., 2002), economists and decision scientists often rely on correlation coefficients
to measure the dependence between two variables.
We start with a striking negative result. Indeed, we show that Keeney’s result does not even
hold when all the N risks are pairwise uncorrelated. Again, we make use of a simple example.
Consider situations (J) and (K), below. The two situations consist of S := 16 states of the
world. In each situation, three agents are faced with the risks x˜1, x˜2, and x˜3, whose pairwise
correlation coefficients are equal to zero before (J) and after the Pigou-Dalton transfer (K). One
can easily verify that corr(x˜1, x˜2) = corr(x˜1, x˜3) = corr(x˜2, x˜3) = 0 and corr(x˜
′
1, x˜
′
2) = corr(x˜
′
1, x˜3) =
corr(x˜′2, x˜3) = 0. The distributions of fatalities, d˜J and d˜′K , are again depicted as trees.
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x˜1 x˜2 x˜3
1 0 1
1 1 1
1 0 1
1 0 1
1 0 1
1 1 1
1 0 0
1 0 0
1 0 0
1 1 0
1 0 0
1 0 0
0 0 1
0 1 0
0 0 1
0 0 0

x˜′1 x˜′2 x˜3
0 1 1
0 1 1
1 0 1
1 0 1
1 0 1
0 1 1
1 1 0
0 0 0
1 1 0
0 0 0
1 1 0
0 0 0
1 0 1
0 0 0
0 1 1
1 1 0

(J) (K)
d˜J
3
2
1
0
pi3 =
2
16
pi2 =
5
16
pi1 =
8
16
pi0 =
1
16
d˜′K
2
0
pi′2 =
12
16
pi′0 =
4
16
Observe that the variance increases from var(d˜J) =
5
8 to var(d˜
′
K) =
6
8 due to the Pigou-
Dalton transfer between agent 1 and 2, demonstrating that the post-transfer distribution of risk
is more variable. However, d˜′K is not more catastrophic. Consider the concave function f(x) =
−max(x − ψ, 0). For ψ = 2.5, E[f(d˜′K)] = 0 > E[f(d˜J)]. Therefore, the Pigou-Dalton transfer
results in an increased variability, but not in more catastrophic risk.
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Situations (J) and (K) indicate that pairwise zero-correlation is insufficient to maintain
Keeney’s result when risks are dependent. Of course, pairwise zero-correlation does not imply
independence. In the above example, x˜1, x˜2, and x˜3 are not independent:
Pr(x˜1 = 1, x˜2 = 1, x˜3 = 1) =
2
16
6= p1p2p3 = 3
32
.
Neither are x˜′1, x˜′2, and x˜3:
Pr(x˜′1 = 1, x˜
′
2 = 1, x˜3 = 1) = 0 6= p′1p′2p3 = (p1 − δ)(p2 + δ)p3 =
1
8
.
We can then prove the following result.
Proposition 7. Assume there are N > 2 agents facing the risks x˜1, ..., x˜N , all of which exhibit
pairwise zero correlation, i.e. corr(x˜i, x˜j) = 0 for all i 6= j. Moreover, assume that after a Pigou-
Dalton transfer in risk between agent 1 and 2 the pairwise correlations are still equal to zero:
corr(x˜′a, x˜′b) = 0 for all a 6= b. Then,
(i) the distribution of fatalities after the Pigou-Dalton transfer may or may not be more catas-
trophic;
(ii) the distribution of fatalities after the Pigou-Dalton transfer is more variable.
Proof. The counterexample shown above proves (i). To prove (ii), we compute the variance of
the distribution of fatalities before and after the Pigou-Dalton transfer for a situation in which all
risks have pairwise zero-correlation. We assume N = 3. Before the transfer, the variance of the
distribution of fatalities is given by
var(d˜) = var(x˜1) + var(x˜2) + var(x˜3) + 2ρ
√
var(x˜1)
√
var(x˜2) + 2cov(x˜1, x˜3) + 2cov(x˜2, x˜3), (5)
where var(x˜i) = pi(1 − pi) for i = {1, 2, 3}. After the transfer, the variance of the distribution of
fatalities becomes
var(d˜′) = var(x˜′1) + var(x˜
′
2) + var(x˜
′
3) + 2ρ
′
√
var(x˜′1)
√
var(x˜′2) + 2cov(x˜
′
1, x˜
′
3) + 2cov(x˜
′
2, x˜
′
3), (6)
with var(x˜′1) = (p1 − δ)(1− p1 + δ), var(x˜′2) = (p2 + δ)(1− p2 − δ), var(x˜′3) = p3(1− p3).
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Using the information on the pairwise zero-correlation, we further simplify expressions (5) and
(6) to
var(d˜) = p1(1− p1) + p2(1− p2) + var(x˜3),
var(d˜′) = (p1 − δ)(1− p1 + δ) + (p2 + δ)(1− p2 − δ) + var(x˜′3).
The result underlines that the Pigou-Dalton transfer only affects the variances of x˜1 and
x˜2, while var(x˜
′
3) = var(x˜3) because the distribution x˜3 did not change. It follows that for all
δ ∈ [0, p1−p22 ], var(d˜′) > var(d˜). The generalization of the proof to N > 3 is straightforward. 
Proposition 7 demonstrates that, for N > 2, it is impossible to make generic statements about
whether the distribution becomes more or less catastrophic based on pairwise correlation coefficients
alone. Yet one can conclude on the variability of the distribution of fatalities. In the rest of the
paper, we will thus focus our attention on the variability of the distribution of fatalities.
4.4 Pigou-Dalton transfers with correlated risks
In this section, we address situations in which the risks to N > 2 agents are correlated. A
Pigou-Dalton transfer in risk is then implemented between agents 1 and 2 (presuming p1 > p2).
If there is dependence among the risks in a N -agent world, one cannot know whether or not the
distribution of fatalities becomes more variable after the Pigou-Dalton transfer. The following
impossibility result underpins our claim.
Proposition 8. Assume there are N > 2 agents facing the risks x˜1, ..., x˜N . The effect of a Pigou-
Dalton transfer in risk (from agent 1 to agent 2) on the distribution of fatalities is ambiguous in
the following sense: If the dependence structure among agents 3,..,N is altered by the transfer, and
if N is large enough, then it is generally impossible to conclude about whether the distribution of
fatalities becomes more or less variable.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 8 states that it is impossible to predict how a Pigou-Dalton transfer in risk alters
the degree of variability when the transfer in risk can arbitrarily affect the dependence structure of
agents not directly involved in the transfer. In the following, we further constrain the problem and
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assume that the variance of the sum of risks faced by the agents not involved in the transfer is fixed.
This additional constraint allows us to formally describe how a Pigou-Dalton transfer between two
correlated risks affects the distribution of fatalities. While the equivalence results established in
Proposition 9 resemble those established in Proposition 6, it is important to recall that, in general,
the notion of “more variable” is less demanding than that of “more catastrophic”.
Proposition 9. Assume that there are N > 2 agents facing the risks x1, ..., xN and the variance
of the distribution of fatalities of agents 3, .., N is not altered through a Pigou-Dalton transfer in
risk δ ∈ [0, p1−p22 ] between agent 1 and agent 2. Then, the two following statements are equivalent:
(i) the distribution of fatalities after the Pigou-Dalton transfer is more variable;
(ii) the new correlation ρ′ between x˜′1 and x˜′2 is strictly larger than a critical level of correlation,
i.e.
ρ′ > ρ∗ +
cov
(
x˜1 + x˜2,
∑N
i=3 x˜i
)
− cov
(
x˜′1 + x˜′2,
∑N
i=3 x˜i
)
√
(p1 − δ)(1− p1 + δ)
√
(p2 + δ)(1− p2 − δ)
, (7)
where ρ∗ is the critical level of correlation (1) given in Proposition 3 for the two-agent world.
Proof. By assumption var(y˜) = var(y˜′). Therefore, var(d˜′) > var(d˜) iff
var(x˜′1) + var(x˜
′
2) + 2ρ
′
√
var(x˜′1)
√
var(x˜′2) + 2cov(x˜
′
1 + x˜
′
2, y˜)
> var(x˜1) + var(x˜2) + 2ρ
√
var(x˜1)
√
var(x˜2) + 2cov(x˜1 + x˜2, y˜).
Solving for ρ′ yields:
ρ′ >
δ (δ − p1 + p2)√
var(x˜′1)
√
var(x˜′2)
+ ρ
√
var(x˜1)
√
var(x˜2)√
var(x˜′1)
√
var(x˜′2)
+
cov(x˜1 + x˜2 − x˜′1 − x˜′2, y˜)√
var(x˜′1)
√
var(x˜′2)
,
where the first two terms on the right hand side are equal to the critical level of correlation ρ∗
found in Proposition 3 for N = 2. 
Some observations on Proposition 9 are warranted. First, note that for the special case ana-
lyzed by Keeney (1980) we have ρ = ρ′ = cov(x˜1 + x˜2 − x˜′1 − x˜′2, y˜) = 0 so that the inequality (7)
is satisfied, because δ − p1 + p2 < 0. More generally, the extension to N agents does not yield a
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different result than the one obtained for two agents when
cov
(
x˜1 + x˜2,
N∑
i=3
x˜i
)
= cov
(
x˜′1 + x˜
′
2,
N∑
i=3
x˜i
)
.
In words, Proposition 9 holds whenever the Pigou-Dalton transfer in risk between agent 1 and agent
2 does not affect the correlation between the distribution of fatalities of these two agents and the
distribution of fatalities of the other N − 2 agents. This condition is less restrictive than assuming
(as we do in Proposition 6) that the dependence of among the agents is fixed. On the other hand,
Proposition 9 considers a weaker concept than that of “more catastrophic”.
5 Conclusion
Risks that may cause many thousand casualties are ubiquitous in today’s world. This paper
examines the statistical dependence structure of risky social situations. In particular, we explore
the relationship between more catastrophic and more equitable distributions of risk. To do so, we
define a more catastrophic situation as a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of fatalities,
and a more equitable situation as one that results in a smaller difference between the probabilities
of death faced by any two agents. Based on these definitions, we demonstrate that more correlation
between two risks is equivalent to a higher probability of simultaneous deaths and we characterize
a set of conditions under which more equity induces such a more catastrophic situation.
The key contribution of our paper is the extension of Keeney (1980)’s seminal result on the
ex ante / ex post conflict in risk management to a world in which risks are interdependent. It
delivers a simple message: Keeney’s result holds whenever the dependence structure is not altered
“too much” by the risk transfer, implying that it always holds when the dependence structure
remains unchanged. The result breaks down when the transfer leads to a significant change in
how the total risk burden is shared among the population at risk. This limitation is important
as it implies that, in specific situations, a policy-induced redistribution of risk can simultaneously
reduce inequity and alleviate catastrophe risk. In general, however, a tradeoff between the two
objectives is to be made. Yet, common social welfare functions (utilitarian, maximin, prioritarian)
are not flexible enough to consider the tradeoff between ex ante and ex post objectives (Bovens
and Fleurbaey, 2012; Rheinberger and Treich, 2016). Policy makers who wish to rank risky social
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situations with respect to these objectives may therefore have to fall back on different approaches
such as multi-criteria analysis.
Generalizations to more than two agents come at the cost of additional complexity. It is
impossible to obtain any result for multiple risks without specifying the change in the dependence
structure. The characterization of all pairwise correlations is—perhaps unsurprisingly—not enough
to derive results on the dependence structure of multiple risks. Keeney’s result does not even hold
when the risks are pairwise uncorrelated; it is sufficient, however, to conclude about the impact
of the risk transfer between two agents—in the presence or absence of other agents—if one is
interested in the weaker notion of more variable risk. In this case, the result applies whenever the
risk transfer does not affect the correlation between the risk distributions of the two agents involved
in the transfer and the distribution of risk among the other N − 2 agents.
While we have derived the above results in the context of mortality risk, the underlying
mathematics apply to other managerial decisions that involve risky binary outcomes. One might
think of defining the optimal vaccination strategy, or allocating resources to innovation initiatives,
or making investment decisions in pharmaceutical labs, to name only a few areas of application.
There is mounting experimental evidence that people care about ex ante and ex post tradeoffs in
risky social decisions, and that the correlation of individual risks matters. We conclude that the
analysis of the dependence structure of social risks is subtle and deserves more attention in future
theoretical and empirical studies.
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Appendix
A.1 Example of independent risks after the risk transfer
We asserted in §3 that it is possible to find examples in which the two risks before the Pigou-
Dalton transfer in risk, x˜1 and x˜2, as well as after the transfer, x˜
′
1 and x˜
′
2, are uncorrelated and
hence independent.11 Consider the below situations (X) and (Y ) with S := 16 states (ω1, ..., ω16).
x˜1 x˜2
1 1
1 1
1 1
0 1
1 0
1 0
1 0
0 0
1 0
1 0
1 0
0 0
1 0
1 0
1 0
0 0

x˜′1 x˜′2
1 1
1 1
0 1
0 1
1 1
1 1
0 1
0 1
1 0
1 0
0 0
0 0
1 0
1 0
0 0
0 0

(X) (Y )
d˜X
2
1
0
pi2 =
3
16
pi1 =
10
16
pi0 =
3
16
d˜′Y
2
1
0
pi2 =
4
16
pi1 =
8
16
pi0 =
4
16
The individual risks x˜1 and x˜2 in the initial situation (X) are independent, and so are the
individual risks x˜′1 and x˜′2 after a Pigou-Dalton transfer of δ =
1
4 . When the risks are independent
before and after the Pigou-Dalton transfer, as in situations (X) and (Y ), the distribution of fatalities
d˜′ = x˜′1 + x˜′2 is more catastrophic than d˜ = x˜1 + x˜2 as predicted by Keeney (Proposition 2).
11In settings with more than two risks, zero correlation does not necessarily imply independence (see situations (J)
and (K) in §4.3). Yet for two Bernoulli random variables zero correlation always implies independence.
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A.2 Proof of statement (i) in Proposition 4 when ρ < 0
Proof. From (1) we have that
ρ∗(δ) :=
δ(p2 − p1 + δ) + ρ√p1
√
1− p1√p2
√
1− p2√
1− p1 + δ
√
p1 − δ
√
p2 + δ
√
1− p2 − δ
.
Using Proposition 3, we need to show that ρ′ > ρ∗(δ) for all δ ∈ (0, p1−p22 ). As we assume that
ρ′ > ρ, it is enough to show that ρ > ρ∗(δ). Note that ρ∗(0) = ρ, thus we study the sensitivity of
ρ∗(δ) to δ. We first compute the derivative of ρ∗(δ) with respect to δ:
∂ρ∗(δ)
∂δ
=
(p1 − p2 − 2δ)(A(δ)ρ+B(δ))
2 [(p1 − δ)(1− p1 + δ)(1− p2 − δ)(p2 + δ)]
3
2
(8)
where
A(δ) :=
√
p1(1− p1)p2(1− p2)(2δ2 + 2δ(p2 − p1)− (1 + 2p1p2 − p2 − p1))
and
B(δ) := (p1p2 + (1− p1)(1− p2))(δ2 + δ(p2 − p1)− 2p1p2) + 2p21p22.
Observe then that the sign of δ 7→ ∂ρ∗(δ)∂δ over [0, p1−p22 ] is the same as the sign of the function
δ 7→ A(δ)ρ+B(δ) for δ ∈ (0, p1−p22 ).
Lemma 2. When ρ < 0, the function δ 7→ A(δ)ρ+B(δ) satisfies the following property
∀δ ∈ (0, p1 − p2
2
), A(δ)ρ+B(δ) < 0. (9)
Proof of Lemma 2. From the expressions of A(δ) and B(δ), we know that A(δ)ρ+B(δ) is a second-
degree polynomial of δ. Differentiating δ 7→ A(δ)ρ+B(δ) gives an affine equation in δ and solving
for its zero gives δ = p1−p22 . The function A(δ)ρ + B(δ) achieves its minimum at this value. In
addition, we now prove that
A(0)ρ+B(0) < 0 A′(0)ρ+B′(0) < 0. (10)
Thus (9) follows because of the properties of a polynomial of the second degree in δ (it is decreasing
over the interval [0, p1−p22 ] and thus takes only negative values over this interval).
To prove (10), we need the expressions of A(0), B(0), A′(0) and B′(0) :
A(0) = −√p1(1− p1)p2(1− p2)(p1p2 + (1− p1)(1− p2))
B(0) = −2p1p2(1− p1)(1− p2)
A′(0) = 2(p2 − p1)
√
p1(1− p1)p2(1− p2)
B′(0) = (p2 − p1)(p1p2 + (1− p1)(1− p2)).
We distinguish two cases:
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Case 1: when p1 + p2 6 1. Then from Lemma 1, ρ > −
√
p1p2√
1−p1
√
1−p2 then
A(0) + ρB(0) 6 p1p2(p1 + p2 − 1) 6 0
A′(0) + ρB′(0) 6 (p2 − p1)(1− p1 − p2) < 0
because p2 < p1.
Case 2: when p1 + p2 > 1. Then from Lemma 1, ρ > −
√
1−p1
√
1−p2√
p1p2
then
A(0) + ρB(0) 6 (1− p1)(1− p2)(1− p1 + p2) < 0
A′(0) + ρB′(0) 6 (p2 − p1)(p1 + p2 − 1) < 0
because p2 < p1. 
Proof of statement (i) in Proposition 4 when ρ < 0. Since δ 6 p1−p22 , then from the expression (8)
and Lemma 2, it is clear that
∀δ ∈
[
0,
p2 − p1
2
]
∂ρ∗(δ)
∂δ
6 0. (11)
When δ = 0, then ρ∗ = ρ. Using the fact that ρ∗ is decreasing in δ (i.e. (11)), then for all
δ ∈ [0, p2−p12 ] ρ∗(δ) 6 ρ∗(0) = ρ 6 ρ′. Since ρ′ satisfies (1), then the distribution of fatalities is
more catastrophic and (i) is proved. 
A.3 Proof of Proposition 5
The fact that the distribution of fatalities d˜ is always less catastrophic than d˜c was first proved
by Tchen (1980). The proof of the first side of the inequality in Proposition 5 follows. The proof
of the other side of the inequality is similar to that of Lemma 3.1 in Bernard et al. (2017). We use
here the fact that the resulting distribution is less catastrophic and not only less variable as it is
the case in their paper.
Lemma 3 (Least catastrophic distribution of fatalities). Denote by µ the average number of fatal-
ities. Define for j = 1, . . . , N,
aj =
(
j∑
i=1
pi
)
mod 1,
and the sets
Ij =
{
[aj−1, aj ] if aj > aj−1
[0, aj ] ∪ [aj−1, 1] if aj < aj−1
,
with the convention that a0 = 0. Then, the least catastrophic distribution is d˜
a :=
∑N
j=1 y˜j where
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y˜j are defined by
y˜j = 1u˜∈Ij , (12)
where u˜ is a standard uniformly distributed random variable over (0,1). Furthermore, d˜a takes only
two values M with probability pM = M + 1− µ and M + 1 with probability 1− pM where M = bµc
(largest integer inferior or equal to µ).
Proof. Let us first observe that y˜j defined by (12) are Bernoulli with parameter pj . Furthermore,
d˜a = y˜1 + y˜2 + · · · + y˜N only takes values M with probability pM or (M + 1) with probability
1 − pM (where pM = 1 may hold if it is constant). Consider any other distribution of fatalities
d˜ = x˜1 + x˜2 + · · · + x˜N with x˜j being a Bernoulli distribution with parameter pj and let us show
that d˜ is more catastrophic than d˜a. Observe that any such distribution of fatalities d˜ takes values
in {0, 1, 2, . . . ., N}.
It is clear that ∀x ∈]0,M [, Fd˜(x) > Fd˜a(x) = 0 and ∀x ∈ [(M + 1),+∞[, Fd˜(x) 6 Fd˜a(x) = 1.
Since Fd˜(x) and Fd˜a(x) are constant on the interval [M,M + 1[ one has
∃c > 0,
{
∀x ∈ (0, c), Fd˜(x) > Fd˜a(x)
∀x ∈ (c,+∞), Fd˜(x) 6 Fd˜a(x)
(13)
namely, c = M + 1 if Fd˜(M) > Fd˜a(x) and c = M if Fd˜(M) 6 Fd˜a(x). In other words, the distribu-
tion function Fd˜ crosses Fd˜a exactly once from above. Since E[d˜] = E[d˜
a] this implies the well-known
one-crossing property that characterizes second-order stochastic dominance. 
A.4 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. The following notation is useful to demonstrate this result. Let Θ be a subset of {1, 2, ..., N}
agents and pΘ be the probability that exactly this subset of agents die. The probability that agent
i dies can then be rewritten as
pi = p{i} +
∑
k1 6=i
p{i,k1} +
∑
k1,k2 6=i
p{i,k1,k2} + ...+ p{1,2,...,N} (14)
because agent i can die alone or together with k = 1, ..., N − 1 other agents.
We demonstrate the result for N = 3. Using Definition (14), we have:
p1 = p{1} + p{1,2} + p{1,3} + p{1,2,3}
p2 = p{2} + p{1,2} + p{2,3} + p{1,2,3}
p′1 = p
′
{1} + p
′
{1,2} + p
′
{1,3} + p
′
{1,2,3}
p′2 = p
′
{2} + p
′
{1,2} + p
′
{2,3} + p
′
{1,2,3}.
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Let us now apply a Pigou Dalton transfer in risk: p′1 = p1 − δ and p′2 = p2 + δ, where
0 6 δ 6 p1−p22 . Because of the assumption of fixed dependence, the Pigou-Dalton transfer in risk
between agents 1 and 2 can only affect p′{1}, p
′
{2} and p
′
{1,2}. Let the probability that agents 1 and 2
die simultaneously become: p′{1,2} = p{1,2}+γ. This leads to p1−δ = p′{1}+p{1,2}+γ+p′{1,3}+p′{1,2,3},
which using p{1,3} = p′{1,3} and p{1,2,3} = p
′
{1,2,3} due to the fixed dependence assumption, implies
p′{1} = p{1} − δ − γ.
Similarly, we have p2 + δ = p
′
{2} + p{1,2} + γ + p
′
{2,3} + p
′
{1,2,3} which using again p{2,3} = p
′
{2,3} and
p{1,2,3} = p′{1,2,3} implies
p′{2} = p{2} + δ − γ.
Therefore, the probability of exactly one death after the Pigou-Dalton transfer is pi′1 = p′{1} +
p′{2} + p
′
{3}, which using p
′
{3} = p{3}, implies
pi′1 = pi1 − 2γ.
Similarly, the probability of exactly two deaths is pi′2 = p′{1,2} + p
′
{1,3} + p
′
{2,3}, which using p
′
{1,3} =
p{1,3} and p′{1,2} = p{1,2} + γ, implies
pi′2 = pi2 + γ.
Finally, the probability that all N = 3 agents die simultaneously does not change due to the
assumption of fixed dependence of agent 3’s risk:
pi′3 = p
′
{1,2,3} = p{1,2,3} = pi3.
This further implies that the probability that nobody dies is equal to
pi′0 = 1− pi′1 − pi′2 − pi′3
= 1− (pi1 − 2γ)− (pi2 + γ)− pi3
= pi0 + γ.
The expressions above for pi′0, pi′1, pi′2 and pi′3 permit to conclude that the distribution of fatalities
becomes more catastrophic after the transfer in risk iff γ > 0, namely iff pi′2 > pi2. We may follow
the proof of Proposition 3 to demonstrate the result. The proof for N > 3 is analogous. 
A.5 Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. We study the distribution of fatalities d˜ = x˜1 + x˜2 + ...+ x˜N . For notational convenience we
partition the distribution into d˜ = x˜1 + x˜2 + y˜ with y˜ := x˜3 + ... + x˜N . It suffices to show that it
34
is not possible to conclude about whether the distribution becomes more variable when N is large
enough. To do so, we compute the variance before and after the Pigou-Dalton risk transfer. The
variance of the pre-transfer distribution of fatalities, var(d˜), and the post-transfer distribution of
fatalities, var(d˜′), follows from (5) and (6), respectively. We are interested in the change in variance:
var(d˜′)− var(d˜) = ∆PD + ∆OA + 2∆cov,
which we split into three terms.
The first term is the change in variance caused by the Pigou-Dalton transfer:
∆PD := var(x˜1
′ + x˜2′)− var(x˜1 + x˜2);
the second term captures the change in dependence among the other agents not involved in the
Pigou-Dalton transfer:
∆OA := var(y˜
′)− var(y˜);
and the third term captures the change in dependence between the two agents involved in the
Pigou-Dalton transfer and all the others:
∆cov := cov(x˜1
′ + x˜2′, y˜′)− cov(x˜1 + x˜2, y˜).
The three terms are not of the same size. If N is large, the change in variance caused by the
Pigou-Dalton transfer ∆PD is bounded, whereas ∆OA is not. Specifically, for any p1 > p2 and any
δ ∈ [0, p1−p22 ],
1 > ∆PD > −2. (15)
The proof of (15) is straightforward and thus details are omitted.12 To compute ∆OA, we
use the two extreme cases identified in Proposition 5, in which y˜′ is a sum of Bernoulli variables
with the respective probabilities pj for j = 3, ..., N . Let µOA := p3 + ... + pN ∈ [Z,Z + 1[ define
the expected number of fatalities among the agents not involved in the transfer (with Z being an
integer). Then
my 6 var(y˜′) 6My,
where the definitions of minimum variance my := (1− µOA + Z) (µOA − Z) and maximum variance
My :=
(√
p3(1− p3) + ...+
√
pN (1− pN )
)2
hold for both var(y˜′) and var(y˜), respectively. Both
extreme situations are possible in the sense that there exists a change in the dependence structure
12Equation (15) follows directly from Lemma 1. There are two possible ways to compute ∆PD: (i) as the difference
between the minimum and maximum variances between the two initial risks x˜1 and x˜2; or (ii) as the difference
between the minimum and maximum variances between the two risks x˜′1 and x˜
′
2 after the Pigou-Dalton transfer.
When p1 + p2 > 1 then the difference between the maximum variance after the transfer and the minimum variance
before the transfer is equal to 2(δ + (1− p1)), which is less than unity under the assumption on the range of δ. The
difference between the maximum variance before the transfer and the minimum variance after the transfer is equal
to −2(1 − p1), which is larger than −2. In the case of p1 + p2 6 1 the bounds are 2(δ + p2) and −2p2 respectively
and the same conclusion holds.
35
of the risks faced by agents 3, ..., N such that var(y˜) is either equal to the minimum variance my;
or equal to the maximum variance My. When N → ∞, the maximum variance My goes to +∞
and the minimum variance satisfies my ∈ [0, 1] (because 0 6 µOA − Z < 1). Thus,
my −My 6 ∆OA 6My −my,
where the lower (upper) bound is obtained when y˜ has maximum (minimum) variance and y˜′ has
minimum (maximum) variance. In other words, the lower bound is equal to the maximum decrease
in variance due to the change in the dependence structure among the risks x˜3, ..., x˜N and the upper
bound is the maximum change of variance due to this change in dependence.
The term ∆cov may increase variability, but what is more important to notice is that the
change in the dependence structure of the risks to the agents not involved in the Pigou-Dalton
transfer (∆OA) potentially offsets any other change in variability (∆PD or ∆cov or their sum), be-
cause the effect is unbounded when N →∞. 
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